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Resilience is widely accepted by research communities, industry and politics as a desirable system
property for cyber-physical systems. However, there exist no scalable and flexible metrics for
resilience that are specific to cyber-physical systems (CPS) and consider the multi-dimensional
nature of performance in these systems. In this work, we present first results towards a framework
to design such a resilience metric. The key values of this framework are threefold: First, it
allows to evaluate resilience with respect to different performance dimensions. Further, unnecessary
complexities of the system can be deliberately left out of the metric to answer specific questions
about the system. Finally, it supports the identification of causes for low resilience to improve the
system design.
resilience, metric, CPS, cyber-physical system, recovery potential, absorbing potential
1. INTRODUCTION
To design and evaluate the resilience of cyber-physical
systems, a scalable, flexible and computable metric
for resilience is needed. A metric is scalable, if
its complexity can be adapted to current needs,
i.e., we can abstract aspects that are not of
interest. Various performance measures can be
used to evaluate a CPS. A flexible metric is
one that can be used to analyse a system with
respect to different performance measures, while
interdependencies between performance measures
and external challenges are considered. To design
such a metric it is necessary to understand the
design principles, domains and the interplay between
these domains for CPS. The dependencies between
performance measures are critical, as they can be used
to identify the causes for decreased resilience and to
motivate changes in the system. Current work does
not provide such a metric.
Arghandeh et al. (2016) provide a detailed definition
of resilience for the power system domain that is
widely applicable for CPS in general. Their work
explicitly excludes the design of a resilience metric.
We use their work as a basis for our framework.
A metric is provided by Linkov et al. (2013)
that describes resilience in four dimensions on a
policy level, which does not capture the runtime
performance of a system. In work by Watson et al.
(2015), the authors identify a strong correlation
between resilience and the probability and impact of
adverse incidents on performance. According to their
work, a system is more resilient if the probability
of adverse incidents and/or their impact is reduced.
While the correlation between resilience and risk
is also defined in other work (Arghandeh et al.
2016), it again ignores the temporal dimension of
resilience. Another set of resilience metrics is given
in Wei and Ji (2010) that observes the temporal
aspect of system performance. However, their work
defines performance as a one-dimensional property
over time. This simplification limits the flexibility
of the metric and it is therefore not possible to
identify the system’s shortcomings based on the
metric results. The closest to a scalable and flexible
metric is the work by Rieger (2014) and Eshghi et al.
(2015). Their metric considers the CPS domains,
analogous to Arghandeh et al. (2016). In Rieger
(2014) resilience is considered with respect to control
stability. The author uses control response and
stability as performance measure. Similarly, Eshghi
et al. (2015) models a system as a hierarchical set
of controllers that are then analysed bottom-up to
retrieve system resilience. It is questionable, however,
how generally applicable control stability is as a
performance measure and therefore how flexible this
metric is.
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Figure 1: Challenge-performance relationship diagram
with respect to CPS domains.
In this work, we present a novel resilience metric
framework. This framework aims to guide the design
of flexible and scalable resilience metrics through
three key properties: First, it allows to evaluate
resilience with respect to different performance
dimensions (e.g., monetary loss as well as system
availability). Second, unnecessary complexities of the
system can be deliberately ignored or simplified
in the metric, to answer specific questions about
the system. For example, while the weather is a
challenge to some performance measures in a power
grid, it is probably not directly relevant for its
resilience against cyber-attacks. Through the ability
to ignore this unnecessary complexity of the system,
the framework becomes more scalable. Finally, the
framework supports the identification of causes for
low resilience, which can be used to improve the
system design.
2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
To derive a mathematical model for CPS resilience,
a common system understanding needs to be
established. In the presented framework, resilience
is considered with respect to system performance.
System performance is comprised of different
performance features that are influenced by each
other and by external challenges. Each performance
feature is the property of one domain of the overall
CPS. We identify our system model based on a three
step approach. The high level results for a generic
CPS are shown in Fig. 1.
1. Domain Identification: CPS, while single
complex systems, are comprised of different
domains that interact to provide a service. In
the same way as Arghandeh et al. (2016), we
have identified three domains: the physical,
the cyber and the control (cyber-physical in
Arghandeh et al. (2016)) domains.
2. Feature Extraction: Each domain contributes a
set of performance features. To produce these
features, the domain leverages capabilities of
related domains. Fig. 1 highlights a set of
performance features for each domain. These
features are generic and need to be refined for
each concrete system and analysis scope, in
order to retrieve a meaningful and measurable
representation of that system.
3. Impact Correlation: Each domain is affected
by challenges that can be internal or external
to the system. External challenges originate
outside the scope of the CPS under evaluation
(e.g., weather conditions). Internal challenges
originate inside the system, and manifest as
a performance degradation of a performance
feature. Thus, it is first necessary to identify
external challenges. Then, for each domain, the
challenges (both internal and external) that
affect the performance of the respective domain
are identified.
The representation in Fig. 1 describes the complexity
of performance and provides a starting point towards
a meaningful metric. For example, a distributed
denial of service attack is a challenge to the cyber
domain. Subsequently the Quality of Service (QoS)
of the communication will decrease. This degraded
performance is not necessarily the performance we
want to evaluate. However, the limited throughput
is a challenge to the control domain, as required
feedback for control decisions can be delayed. On this
level the original challenge, the attack, is abstracted
by a performance feature from the cyber domain.
3. RESILIENCE METRIC FRAMEWORK
Due to the multi-dimensional nature of performance
in CPS, there needs to be a clear decision with respect
to what should be measured. Each performance
feature represents one dimension of performance, and
depends on other performance features, as well as
external challenges. Given that each performance
feature has a nominal performance pN and is
described by a function p(t) with respect to time,
we can measure resilience R as the area between
the actual performance and the nominal performance.
This relation is described by Eq. 1. It results in a
single numerical value between 0 (no resilience) and
1 (perfect resilience).
R : R+ → [0; 1] : t 7→ 1− 1(t− t0)pN ·
∫ t
t0
p(τ)dτ (1)
This metric can be used directly for a running
system, if p(t) is measurable. However, on its
own, it does not allow to draw any conclusions
about the causes of the performance decrease. To
enable a meaningful use of resilience, the metric
needs to model the influences on performance to
identify causes. According to Arghandeh et al. (2016),
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resilience in a system is rooted in two potentials. The
absorbing potential is the degree in which challenges
can be handled without performance degradation.
The recovery potential describes a system’s ability to
restore normal operation in the face of challenges.
The change in performance can then be described
with respect to these two potentials, as well as the
severity of challenges. Equation 2 provides a general
representation of this differential equation, which is
solvable as an initial value problem (IVP), where
p(t0) = p0.
p˙(t) = [f(t, r, p(t), pN )− g(t,~a,~c(t), p(t))] ·Θ(p(t))
(2)
Here, f represents the recovery potential that has
a positive impact on performance. It depends on
the time t, a recovery rate r that needs to be
identified for each system and can be a scalar or
a more complex function, the current performance
p(t) and the nominal performance pN which can
never be exceeded. On the other hand, g represents
the negative impact of challenges on performance
and is analogous to Arghandeh’s absorbing potential.
It depends on the time, a set of challenges ~c(t)
and the current performance. Further, ~a describes
normative factors for each challenge. They need
to be defined for each challenge and makes them
comparable. Further, they represent the impact of
each challenge on performance. Finally, Θ(p(t)) is
a heaviside function that describes the performance
threshold pT under which the system is considered
collapsed. Once collapsed, a system has a recovery
potential of 0 and cannot restore performance. The
function is defined by Eq. 3.
Θ : R+ → {0, 1} : t 7→
{
1, p(t) > pT
0, p(t) ≤ pT
(3)
An example of a concrete equation for the recovery
potential can be found in Eq. 4. It describes a recovery
process that has the nominal performance as an
equilibrium solution. The recovery speed depends on
the system specific recovery rate r.
f(t, r, p(t), pN ) = r · (1− p(t)
pN
) · p(t) (4)
As shown by Fig. 1, each domain is exposed to a set
of challenges. These challenges build ~c(t) and can be
external or internal. To get a better understanding
of their impact on performance (formally described
by g), four basic types of challenges can be
identified. Equations 5 - 8 describe these basic types
mathematically; a visualisation and description is
given by Fig. 2.
g(t, a, c(t)) = a · c(t) (5)
g(t, a, c(t)) = a ·
∫ t
t0
c(τ) dτ (6)
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of performance
behaviour with respect to the four different challenge types
given in Eq. 5 - 8. Without loss of generality, we assume
a smooth change in challenge levels for better visibility.
More specifically, challenges and also performance in CPS
can change abruptly. These changes are possible with the
use of the mathematical representation, even if not shown
here.
g(t, a, c(t)) = a ·
∫ t
t−∆t
c(τ) dτ (7)
g(t, a, c(t), p(t)) =
{
a · c(t), p(t) > pT
0, p(t) ≤ pT
(8)
To describe the different challenge types in more
detail, an example from the smart grid domain will
be provided for each type. Note, that a meaningful
example cannot be given by a challenge alone.
It needs to describe the relationship between a
challenge and a specific performance feature that
is affected by the challenge. In the first case (see
Eq. 5 and Fig. 2a), the decrease of performance is
immediate and proportional to the severity of the
challenge. An example for this type is given by the
relationship between the amount of power produced
by a solar panel and the coverage of the sun. If the
sunlight is blocked, the energy production decreases
immediately. In the same way, the performance will
increase again, as the amount of sunlight reaching the
panel increases. Equation 6 and Fig. 2b describe the
case where the impact of a challenge on performance
stays present even after the challenge has abated.
A challenge can manifest as a quick short burst,
with a long lasting impact. For example, an operator
is interested in the number of components in the
distribution system that are operational to ensure
that the N-1 criterion is not violated. Wind is
a challenge to these components. With increasing
windspeeds, a tree might fall on a power line and
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ground that line. The performance measure (number
of operational components) is reduced through the
challenge, even if the windspeed decreases afterwards.
The third type (see Eq. 7 and Fig. 2c) describes
challenge performance relationships where the impact
depends on the recent challenge history. In contrast
to type two, the impact will fade away over time,
however, in contrast to type one it is not only
dependent on the current challenge level. An example
is a controller that minimizes the harmonics in
the distributed power signal. It is challenged by
an integrity attack on the feedback value. As a
consequence, the controller will introduce harmonics
to the system. Once the attack is mitigated and
the controller regains state awareness it will work to
minimize the introduced harmonics again. However,
this will take time depending on the degree of
harmonics in the system after the attack. The final
case is described by Eq. 8 and Fig. 2d. The impact of
a challenge on performance cannot get higher than a
certain threshold. At some point, even if the challenge
level further increases there is no more impact on
performance. As an example, we can assume a real-
time controller that imposes strict time constraints
on feedback measurements. An increase in the time
delay on the communication network will cause some
missed windows by feedback at first. However, once
all windows get missed, a further delay will not cause
any further performance decrease.
From these four types, some conclusions can be
drawn. Each challenge can be modeled by a single
type or by a combination of multiple types. Then, g
is the sum of negative impacts from each challenge on
performance. In the case that a challenge is internal,
the performance decrease of one performance feature
is a challenge to other performance features. Equation
9 provides a generic formula to convert a performance
decrease into an increase in challenge level p(t)
with respect to the nominal performance pN . Here,
x describes the normalising factor to match the
performance unit to the other challenge units.
τ : R+ → R+ : t 7→ 1
x
· (pN − p(t)) (9)
4. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a scalable and flexible framework
to design a numerical resilience metric for CPS;
something that is needed to draw meaningful
conclusions about a system from its resilience. The
framework design is based on a recent definition
of resilience by Arghandeh et al. (2016) and
is an improvement over future work by Rieger
(2014) and Eshghi et al. (2015). It supports the
design of a resilience metric that can evaluate
a system with respect to different dimensions of
performance that we call performance features. By
doing so, a more flexible metric can be built because
the scope of the evaluation goal can be better
represented by the metric. A metric designed with
this framework is not only describing a specific
performance feature. It also models the dependency
between the measured performance and external as
well as internal challenges. That way the metrics can
be used to reason about the causes for decreased
resilience and subsequently to improve system design.
Finally, the framework encourages the metric designer
to develop a detailed system understanding. With
this understanding, the designed metrics can be
more flexible, as it allows informed and deliberate
decisions about simplifications to the metrics. This is
important, as models of CPS should be meaningful
abstractions to handle the system’s complexity. In
future work, we will use this framework to develop
a resilience metric for a concrete system in the smart
grid domain.
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